One always begins by 'drawing a distinction', Niklas Luhmann was fond of reminding us, and Arendt begins On Revolution by drawing a distinction that throughout the treatise remains stark, pivotal, resistant, insubordinate to mediation, synthesis and sublation. It is the distinction between the social and the political. It lies at the basis of the constitutional question, and as foundational informs not just the remit of the constitutional but its very possibility: because it does not allow us to step behind it, the foundation that is, and to put it to question politically.
of abdication, and thus of a certain refusal of a different route. What, one might pause to ask, does 'abdication of freedom' mean for the sans-culottes? What possibility of freedom did the Parisian mob really forgo in bringing the 'needs of the body' into the streets? What makes this simple question so difficult for Arendt to ask? Nothing but her unwavering reassertion of the founding disjuncture. Notwithstanding the lip service to his greatness ('the greatest theorist the revolutions ever had'), a kind of knee-jerk antiMarxism dominates her thinking here, most tellingly in the extraordinary reversal that she attributes to Marx in the 'social question'.
Marx's genius and ultimately his theoretical error, for Arendt, is that he read the social question in political terms. That means that he read the question of poverty as a question of the suppression of freedom, and the way he achieved this was through the theory of exploitation. This allows the connection between the two spheres to be 'mediated':
Marx's transformation of the social question into a political force is contained in the term 'exploiation', that is in the notion that poverty is the result of exploitation through a 'ruling class' which is in the possession of the means of violence...His most explosive and indeed most original contribution … was that he interpreted the compelling needs of mass poverty in political terms as an uprising, not for the sake of bread or wealth, but for the sake of freedom as well. 7 Thus, asserts Arendt, in order to conjure up a 'spirit of rebelliousness that can spring only from being violated, not from being under the sway of necessity' Marx helped to persuade the poor 'that poverty itself is a political not a natural phenomenon, the result of violence and violation rather than scarcity '. 8 Arendt sets out to prove Marx wrong to interpret the 'predicament of poverty in categories of oppression and exploitation', by returning to the embeddedness of her founding distinction, the foundational character of the disconnect. 9 This involves a striking reversal that puts the burden on her interlocutor to defend the attempted 'synthesis' through exploitation. Her argument involves as ever the restatement of the obviousness of her premises and the foundational nature of the organising disjuncture.
The recovery of the ability to act cannot spring from necessity since the logic of 'emancipation' is too rooted in the release of a natural propensity. Becoming-political is thus a problem for Arendt in the absence of the preconditions of such action in freedom.
It is this absence that drives Marx to attach himself to the Hegelian dialectic in which 'freedom would directly rise out of necessity', a dialectic and a coincidence that Arendt has earlier characterised as 'perhaps the most terrible and, humanly speaking, least bearable paradox in the body of modern thought'. 10 But for Arendt the two spheres are not and cannot be tied dialectically -necessity never gets a foothold in a dialectic of action.
Having repeated her premises, Arendt's rebuttal of Marx becomes fairly cursory.
Her first criticism is that he abandons 'the revolutionary élan of his youth' to redefine it in economic terms, which means also the 'iron laws of historical necessity' 11 ; 'necessity' again serving to fold the revolutionary moment back into the binarism from which it seemingly never can depart. Her second criticism is that he 'strengthened more than anybody else the politically most pernicious doctrine of the modern age, namely that life is the highest good and that the life process of society is the very centre of human endeavour.' 12 With this new emphasis, the role of revolution is no longer to liberate men from the oppression of their fellow men, let alone to found freedom, but to liberate the life process of society itself from the fetters of scarcity so that it would swell into a stream of abundance. Not freedom but abundance became the new aim of revolution.
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A displacement thus of the very aspiration of political action, a falling short that turns out to be a radical undercutting of the logic of political action.
If this appears a rather odd rendering of Marx, or at least a rather facile turning of the later Marx against his earlier, better self, it is because it is that, both odd and facile, based on an impatient misreading that identifies in Marx the 'ambition to raise his science to the rank of a natural science' at the expense of the political, 'a surrender of freedom to necessity'. 14 'The trouble,' Arendt will tell us, 'is of a theoretical nature'. 15 Marx's economic explanations simply merge violence and necessity together back into the sphere 11 Ibid 64.
that, properly understood, is on the other side of the political, the concept itself of a 'political economy' an impossible merger of two domains.
Antonio Negri, who in Insurgencies initially reserves some praise for Arendt's 'very rich and fierce phenomenological exercise', is left 'ill at ease' at this point by her 'definition of constituent power'. 16 'The constitutive phenomenology of the principle reveals itself as perfectly conservative' and she thus 'bears the responsibility of the contempt towards the multitude that does not want to be the people, of a constituent power that does not want to be the bourgeoisie'.
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We shall return to Negri's careful rebuttal of Arendt's take on constituent power later. For now we join him in feeling somewhat 'ill at ease' with what in fact confronts us here: an astounding 'partage of the sensible', a carving up and separating-off of the question of human welfare from politics, and the redress of misery from what is properly the political aspiration of freedom. To claim that the masses that storm revolutionary Paris in 1789, and then in 1848 and in July 1871, raise the 'social' rather than the political question, is to sever the question of distribution from the political means of redressing asymmetries in access to the means of production and the distribution of its products. In Arendt, this severing underwrites nothing less than the understanding itself of the political and the possibility itself of freedom.
We have seen how the social/political distinction is mapped onto that between necessity and freedom, and Marxism rejected as suggesting an unsustainable bridging of both sets through the notion of exploitation, a move that in Arendt becomes something akin to a categorical mistake. This constitutive severing is buttressed through a second one, and the distinction between compassion and solidarity deployed to qualify further the political proper. With Marx, she has expelled 'exploitation' from the political; with Rousseau she is now poised to expel 'compassion'.
One of the many striking features of the analysis of the 'social question' in On Revolution is that it relegates Rousseau to a theorist of 'compassion' in the first place, in taking as fundamental Rousseau's near-axiomatic 'innate repugnance at seeing a fellow human suffer'. 18 Rousseau found compassion to be the most natural human reaction to the suffering of others, and therefore the very foundation of all authentic 'natural' human intercourse' 19 :
It was this capacity for suffering that Rousseau had pitted against the selfishness of society on the one hand, against the undisturbed solitude of the mind, on the other. And it was to this emphasis on suffering, more than to any other part of his teachings, that he owed the enormous, predominant influence over the minds of the men who were to make the Revolution, and who found themselves confronted with the overwhelming sufferings of the poor to whom they had opened the doors to the public realm and its light for the first time in history. the will is uprooted from the worldly institutions which alone underwrote what they had in common, and thus cancelled it out.
It is on these grounds that Arendt will condemn the colonisation of public space by the ideals of compassion and virtue, and a misconception of solidarity that stems from the latter to inform the former (solidarity will be restored later to its proper politicalinstitutional understanding): 'Robespierre's "terror of virtue" cannot be understood without taking into account the crucial role compassion had come to play in the minds and hearts of those who acted in the course of the French Revolution.' 25 Compassion, with its gaze on concreteness and particularity, is both inappropriate institutionally and destructive when it informs the acts of the 'virtuous', because it collapses the space inbetween that commonality demands as constitutive of what it means to share a world:
Because compassion abolishes the distance, the worldly space between men where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located, it remains, politically speaking, irrelevant and without consequence…As a rule it is not compassion which sets out to change worldly conditions in order to ease human suffering, but if it does, it will shun the drawn-out wearisome processes of persuasion, negotiation and compromise, which are the processes of law and politics, and lend its voice to the suffering itself, which must claim for swift and direct action, that is, for action with the means of violence.
26
By the time we reach section 4 of Arendt's chapter, 'compassion' has given way to 'pity', and its objects, 'les malheureux', have respectively given way to 'les faibles' in order for the 'alternative' to be designated as 'solidarity' 27 :
'Solidarity' allows men to establish deliberately and, as it were, dispassionately a community of interest with the oppressed and the exploited. The common interest would then be the 'grandeur of man', or the 'honour of the human race', or the dignity of man. For solidarity, because it partakes of reason, and hence of generality, is able to comprehend a multitude conceptually, not only the multitude of a class or a nation, or a people, but eventually all mankind. But this solidarity, though it may be aroused by suffering, is not guided by it, and it comprehends the strong and the rich no less than the weak and the poor; compared with the sentiment of pity, it may appear cold and abstract, for it remains committed to ideas -to greatness or honour, or dignity -rather than to any 'love' of men.
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Notwithstanding the perhaps underhand dig at Robespierre -that 'pity' has a 'vested interest in the existence of the unhappy' 29 -it has also 'proved to possess a greater capacity for cruelty than cruelty itself'. 'Proved' is an odd word here in the midst of a conceptual analysis, but it does reveal something interesting about a certain bias that returns and returns again to colour the mapping of distinctions. But there is something even more disquieting about the direction that Arendt's analysis now takes. She aims it, again, at the Jacobins: since the Revolution had opened the gates of the political realm to the poor, this realm had indeed become 'social'. It was overwhelmed by the cares and worries which actually belonged in the sphere of the household and which, even if they were permitted to enter the public realm, could not be solved by political means, since they were matters of administration, to be put into the hands of experts, rather than issues which could be settled by the twofold process of decision and persuasion. selectively opened up and simultaneously foreclosed a space for the appearance of the political. What is at stake is the withdrawal of that space of appearance, as in the case where the social demands of recognition and distribution are denied a political register.
The denial is then effaced, doubly forgotten or rendered 'immemorial' in Lyotard's precise meaning, when the very purity of the constitutional question demands that its statement in political terms proper -as condition of freedom -is its unburdening from the social question.
II. Domesticating the Agon
Arendt's fundamental distinction between the social and the political thus effectively domesticates the agonism that she valorises, evacuating any transformative potential that it might otherwise promise. Arendt offers a powerful image of constituent power as pertaining not only to the act of constituting the laws of government but to the constitution of the common, the disclosure of a common world. 34 For her, a revolution is properly political to the extent that it aims at constituting and preserving a space of appearances within which citizens can continue to engage in a striving for distinction and recognition. From the agonistic interplay of a plurality of perspectives brought to bear within the public sphere, the commonness of the world that lies between citizens is constantly disclosed and reconstituted. While liberation from domination by men and the necessities of nature is a condition of possibility for the establishment of such a space of appearances, this space, she insists, emerges only through the enactment and enjoyment of freedom as an end in itself.
In contrast to her characterisation of the necessity, hierarchy, obscurity and conformity of the social, her conception of the political in terms of spontaneity, equality, publicity and plurality presents an inspiring image of constituent power. Indeed, Negri admires Arendt for having 'given us the clearest image of constituent power in its radicalness and strength'. 35 Constituent power inheres in the exhilarating experience of initiatory action, but ultimately also in the production of the common. For Arendt, as Negri puts it, freedom 'becomes public space, constituting a communicative relation, its own conditions of possibility and therefore its own strength. It is the polis. Freedom is a beginning that poses its own conditions'. political ontology in underpinned by a dichotomy between necessity and freedom. One cannot bracket here without undoing, or at least leaving the political fundamentally under-determined. Indeed, for Arendt, the achievement of action is precisely the transcendence of necessity: the causal relations to which the natural world is subject. It is through this transcendence that actors distinguish themselves as human. Conversely, subjection to necessity is inherently dehumanising. To be subject to necessity is to be deprived of the possibility of meaningful action and the existential achievement of selfdisclosure. Hence her unflattering descriptions of "savages", stateless people, the poor and other marginalised groups.
For Arendt, human beings are capable of action by virtue of being born. She takes birth, here, not as a biological fact that humans share with animals but as a social fact, since only human beings appear at birth in a world that is constituted through work and action. This world is a condition of possibility for the event of birth because the human artifice produced through work provides a measure of durability and permanence against the cyclical futility of nature. Moreover, the web of relationships that are constituted through action provides a social context in which the event can be witnessed, commemorated and invested with meaning.
Correlatively, the established constitution of a political community is part both of the artifice of things (as nomos, its wall-like aspect enclosing the common) and of the web of relationships (as lex, its relational aspect constituting individuals as persons through mutual recognition). The purpose of the constitution is to enable the continuity of the community through time by providing a measure of permanence to human affairs, to house the space of appearances, making possible an organised remembrance. Moreover, it provides a measure of predictability through establishing shared expectations, that enables the polity to act into the future. The purpose of a constitution should be to commemorate the inaugural event through which the community is constituted, so that the principle of freedom it revealed can inspire and animate the public sphere of the constituted community. Through speaking and acting together within this public sphere citizens would thus enact their freedom anew, augmenting the authority of the constitution that was anticipated in its founding moment.
Arendt's thought has the merit of returning our attention to the fundamental dimension of politics as always ultimately concerned with the constitution of the common. However, it is difficult to extract from her work a conception of transformative politics precisely because her conception of action is 'ontologically rooted' in the 'fact of natality'. 38 For her, the world-disclosive possibility of action is tied to the desire for selfdisclosure, which she takes to be part of the human condition. The struggle for recognition to which this gives rise and the common that it discloses emerges against the dark background of the sheer givenness of human existence in a state of nature. What this ontological grounding of agonism elides, however, is how the common itself, its stakes and its shares, can become the object of political contest.
To be sure, in the Arendtian public sphere, individuals contest the way the world appears to them through the exchange of opinions. But politicisation typically entails a struggle to represent a rival image of the common, which denaturalises our common sense of the world. Arendt's interest in the initiatory quality of praxis, however, does not arise from a concern to conceptualise acts of politicisation. Rather, her concern is with resisting the rise of mass society, which made possible totalitarianism. In particular,
Arendt deplores the emergence of what Foucault would call biopolitics ('the rise of the social') in which the life process of society (or the population) becomes the primary concern of politics. Arendt blames the modern elevation of life to the highest of goods for the spread of world-alienation, loneliness, and the futility and meaningless of modern life, which created a vacuum within which totalitarianism could emerge.
In modernity, the scope for human freedom has been diminished because the activity of labour and its concern with satisfying the needs of the body -'making life easier and longer'-have come to dominate the public realm. 39 While Arendt distinguishes the political sharply from the social, then, this is not a simple opposition.
Whereas, for Arendt, our political interest in actualising freedom is a properly public concern, our economic interest in sustaining life is a properly private concern. The social, in contrast, is a hybrid realm that comes about by the improper pursuit of economic concerns in public life. Society is the 'public organization of the life process itself … the form [of living together] in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance'. 40 The cost of elevating life as the ultimate end of political organisation is that human affairs are deprived of the reality and significance that comes from the world-disclosing activity of praxis.
39 Ibid 208.
Arendt turns to the Greek polis to recuperate a conception of the political that might redeem the contemporary world from this malaise. She looks to the experience of the Greek polis not out of nostalgia but, she claims, because 'a freedom experienced in the process of acting and nothing else -though, of course, mankind never lost this experience altogether -has never again been articulated with the same classical clarity.'
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And it is in this context that she appropriates the Aristotelian distinction between zoe and bios: 'between activities related to a common world and those related to the maintenance of life, a division which all ancient political thought rested as self-evident and axiomatic'. 42 According to Aristotle, she observes, the good life was "good" to the extent that having mastered the necessities of sheer life, by being freed from labour and work, and by overcoming the innate urge of all living creatures for their own survival, it was no longer bound to the biological life process.
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The political ontology that she outlines in The Human Condition (with its threefold distinction between labour, work and action) thus accounts for the intransigence of the distinction between the social and the political that pervades her conceptual and historical analyses in On Revolution. Whereas the activity of labour corresponds to the human condition of life itself, the activity of praxis corresponds to the condition of plurality.
Labour is inherently unpolitical and potentially anti-political for Arendt, since it is 'an activity in which man is neither together with the world nor with other people, but alone Arendt's brief but approving references to the agonism of the Greeks are made in this context. She contrasts the ancient concern to distinguish oneself in public before one's peers with the conformist behaviour of modern society and its equality based on sameness. In Athens, she writes, the public realm 'was permeated by a fiercely agonal spirit, where everybody had constantly to distinguish himself from all others, to show through unique deeds or achievements that he was the best'. 46 The public realm 'was the only place where men could show who they really and inexchangeably were'. 47 Arendt turns to the experience of the polis to articulate a conception of the political as a space of appearances, 'the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking', an emergent space which 'can find its proper location almost anytime and anywhere'.
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Now it is of course true that scholars inspired by Arendt's agonistic conception of politics do acknowledge that her strict separation of the social and the political is untenable since it precludes matters of social justice from public debate and privatises 44 Ibid 212. 45 Ibid. the defining feature of action. On this account it is possible to imagine an agonistic politics of need that would involve the politicisation of social suffering.
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And yet even this careful Arendtian account of becoming-political stumbles on Arendt's very starting points. An Arendtian conception of the political is inadequate for thematising acts of politicisation because it only allows for the emergence of a 'we' in a situation where political actors are neither for nor against but only 'with' others. The agonistic striving for distinction can take place only within a community of equals.
Consequently, the struggle to overcome social domination can be understood only as a pre-political act of liberation, following which a new political freedom might be inaugurated. And it is here, perhaps, above all that Arendt may have stood to learn something from Marx had she not been so quick with her wholesale dismissal. 54 As neoMarxists (Negri, Badiou and Rancière amongst them) have variously argued, the productivity of political action, the constitution of new forms of commonality or subjectivity first emerge precisely in moments of political antagonism. Far from being a necessary precondition for politics, equality is more often than not the object of political dispute, in situations where equality (even visibility) must be claimed by actors from an conflict demonstrate their equality; and in doing so, disclose new subject positions and another possible world.
Citing John Adams in On Revolution, Arendt asserts that the fundamental deprivation suffered by the poor is that of appearance within a common world. She observes sympathetically that 'Marx's effort to rewrite history in terms of class struggle was partially at least inspired by the desire to rehabilitate posthumously those to whose When the labour movement appeared on the political scene, it was the only organization in which men acted and spoke qua men -and not qua members of society. For this political and revolutionary role of the labour movement … it is decisive that the economic activity of its members was incidental and that its force of attraction was never restricted to the ranks of the working class. If for a time it almost looked as if the movement would succeed in founding, at least within its own ranks, a new public space with new political standards, the spring of these attempts was not labour -neither the labouring activity itself nor the always utopian rebellion against life's necessities -but those injustices and hypocrisies which have disappeared with the transformation of a class society into a mass society and with the substitution of a guaranteed annual wage for daily or weekly pay.
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The argument is riddled with circularity and contradiction.
Arendt begins by conceding the 'apparently flagrant discrepancy between historical fact -the political productivity of the working class -and the phenomenal data obtained from [her] analysis of the labouring activity'. 59 'Apparently flagrant' is an odd formulation that captures something of her unease at the wedge she herself has driven between the history of constituent political power of the labour movement and her political ontology that denies them that their action is political, let alone constituent. To get herself out of this 'apparently flagrant discrepancy' she will claim that the labour movement was really only incidentally about labour. It was not the 'necessities' associated with a decent wage, decent working conditions, a degree of control over the productive process, the re-appropriation of the means of production, the scope of claims that one would assume make the labour movement a labour movement. Instead, for Arendt, it was about 'founding a new public space' where workers would act 'qua menand not qua members of society', 'at least', she concedes enigmatically, 'within its own ranks'. Are we to assume that the meaning of that confinement (its own ranks) is to some form of workplace democracy?
Obviously Arendt has nothing so confining in mind, and in order to rescue the political from the social, she will go on to insist that the contradiction into which she is led by her political ontology is only apparent. For, she argues, the world-disclosing (and therefore 'properly political') aspect of the labour movement 'stemmed from its fight against society as a whole'. But with this desperate gesture to cleanse the movement from its origin in and connectedness to the social, in order to restore it untainted as properly political, Arendt tips the balance the other way. A 'fight against society as a whole' imports antagonism, a fight not on a political plane but against those who have appropriated that plane: against, thus, the bourgeois appropriation of the public sphere on the basis of the particular configuration of the public/private distinction. 60 Arendt is right to sense in the labour movement a challenge to precisely that configuration, one that relegates the demands of those at work to the private sphere and thus submits her valued principles of association -as non-political -to capitalist accumulation. A reaction of this kind and magnitude can only be antagonistic, not productive, to the public sphere as given. But now Arendt is caught. On the one hand her insistence on 'natality' draws her to world-disclosure of a different kind, that breaks into the given with the promise of the new. On the other hand her political ontology and the entrenchment of the social/political distinction prevents her from acknowledging what is distinctive about what the labour movement discloses to politics, because that would be founding the political in the social.
If antagonism was the condition of possibility for the dramatic appearance of the labour movement on the political scene, Arendt's conception of constituent power is emaciated precisely because she wants to isolate it from the social struggle -with its stakes, its subject-positions and its opportunities of disclosure -that gives rise to its appearance in the first place. She deprives it of any possible political purchase by abstracting world-disclosure from the material social context within which political actors come into conflict. There is something both profound and disquieting in all this. Arendt's
phenomenology is about what appears as political, with its attendant attributes and functions of disclosure. To distil this emergence of the political and identify the possibilities of action that pertain to it she will resist any form of 'instrumentalization of action and [with it] the degradation of politics into a means for something else', and she will cleanse it of its origin in social divides and hierarchies. To this, she will establish a principle of formal equality and plurality as proper to the political -proper in the fundamental sense of constitutive -where discrimination and sheer difference characterise the social. That is how the political is first enabled in the mapping out through the specific binarisms and the opportunities they sustain.
Arendt has been celebrated for her uncompromising defence of the political and her eloquent analysis of all that it sustains and makes possible: new beginnings, solidarity, wordliness. And she has policed the boundaries of the political from all aspects of society's life that would impinge on it with claims that are properly those of administering and dealing with necessity. As in ideology's most pervasive move, the enabling move displaces alternatives that are simultaneously occluded and forgotten. that is, of the appearance of the political with all its world-disclosing brilliance -it is an emergence that Arendt can only tentatively sustain and sustain at a huge cost. The cost has to do, as we saw, with the bracketing from the sphere of properly political action and debate of all that which for her would contaminate it with society's concerns and the administration of life's necessities. 'Tentatively' because the political must be maintained as agonistic rather than antagonistic at all costs, maintained that is through the distribution of speaking positions that guarantees a certain confluence along given coordinates. Against this confluence, antagonism would import a constitutive negativity.
And import it, for Arendt, in a way that would undercut the political. In the forms that Arendt was perhaps most eager to excise, it aimed to resist the move itself that discloses politics and sustains the plane of appearance as reductive, because depleted of what could in fact alone be constitutive of it as 'common': the equal share in the processes of social labour and the fruits of social production.
